This discussion of the ECJ in the context of a project on political representation in the EU responds to the Court's changing functions in the integration process and also to the critique which the exercise of this function has provoked in recent years after the Court objected to constitutional provisions and legislation of constitutional status in particular in the sphere of labour law and social protection. The ECJ has been accused of partisanship with a neoliberalmonetarist agenda. These debates are bound to extend to the new functions which were assigned to the CJEU in the supervision of the budgetary discipline of Member States in the Euro zone. The problems that might arise in such a case have been foreshadowed by the recent jurisprudence on the legality of the European practices of crisis management. The
Who is the Guardian for Constitutionalism in Europe after the Financial Crisis?
I. Ceding the Constitution to the Political Guardian?
The issue and problem of 'constitutional guardianship' is one with a long history. It was answered starkly and infamously by Carl Schmitt during and with regard to the final, crisis-ridden, years of the Weimar Republic: The guardian of the Constitution is not the Reichsgericht, the judicial branch, but the Reichspräsident, a political actor exercising the quasi dictatorial powers defined in Article 48 of the Weimar constitution on behalf of a politically homogeneous Volk. 1 This particular understanding of constitutional guardianship has now re-achieved a disquieting degree of topicality within a crisis ridden European Union. This dimension of our topic will be discussed in more details in the second part of our contribution. We begin, however, with a series of reflections on the issue of constitutional guardianship within the Union in less fraught times. Even prior to crisis, the problem was highly troublesome, albeit that very few commentators, and even fewer institutional actors, recognised the true nature of the challenge. Nevertheless, this challenge is now becoming ever more apparent in step with a growing and critical awareness of deeply entrenched -even growing -diversity within Europe and the obviously paradoxical nature of a voluntaristic response to diversity, which is ever more insistent in its pursuit of a future unity, but which cannot explain how this project might be realized through democratic processes.
When set against this background, the relevance of our topic to a context of debate upon democratic representation should be obvious. To be sure, courts, generally-speaking, are the non-majoritarian vanguard institutions par excellence of constitutional democracies. Non-partisanship defines their very ethos. Nevertheless, Constitutional courts, in particular, do not find their prestige and authority exclusively within the legal provisions of the Constitutions that establish them. Typically, these provisions do not endow them with powers of enforcement. Instead, constitutional courts rely and build upon a Weberian legitimacy, which they acquire to a significant degree through the modes in which they articulate and thereby 'represent' both the normed character, as well as, the normative dignity of the order in which they are situated and operate. In other words, constitutional legitimacy is founded within a tense duality of rule-bounded, but socially responsive adjudication.
This twofold -formal and social -embeddedness of constitutional courts presents its own very particular problems within a European constellation, and impacts -as we shall demonstrate -cumulatively upon the issue of the constitutional guardianship of the EU. The European Union is, as the Preamble of the Treaty of Lisbon and numerous of its Articles assure us, 2 committed to human rights, freedom, equality, democracy and the rule of law. Adherence to these commitments is a condition for membership within the Union; at least in theory. Constitutional adjudication came later to Europe than to America, but is nonetheless one which has gained the status of a common European heritage. How, however, might this legacy be understood in the context of the sui generis Union with its multi-level system of governance? Which institution is in a position to exercise the function of constitutional guardianship within such a constellation? Certainly, the ECJ/CJEU springs immediately to mind. But that conclusion would be premature and far too superficial. The European Court has never been formally established as a 'constitutional' body. To be sure, its foundational jurisprudence on direct effect and supremacy, the Cassis-jurisprudence and its aftermath, its characterisation of the Treaties as a 'constitutional charter,' 3 presupposes and assumes important supervisory function for law 'at all levels of governance,' which are widely recognised by the courts and authorities of many jurisdictions and with great emphasis and near unanimity in European law scholarship. However, this power cannot be considered to be comprehensive, even in theory, as long as 'Union competences are governed by the principle of conferral.' 4 Equally, its validity will be doubted for as long There is much to scrutinise here: legal problems as well as the way they are dealt with in legal scholarship. We will restrict our discussion here to the particular form of authoritarian crisis management, which the new machinery has established. This managerialism is delicate for three inter-dependent reasons. First, through the supervision and control of imbalances, it disregards the principle of enumerated powers, and, by the same token, disrespects the democratic legitimacy of national institutions, in particular, the budgetary powers of parliaments. Secondly, in its departure from the onesize-fits-all philosophy orienting European integration in general and monetary policy in particular, it nonetheless fails to achieve a variation, which might be founded in democratically legitimated choices; quite to the contrary, 
IV. The Law or the Political as Constitutional Guardian
The German Constitutional Court has a much contested record with respect to its European commitments and loyalty -even though signals of disobedience have always remained rhetorical. The ECJ has overruled national law in countless cases -but has hardly ever found European legal acts to be at fault.
Investigating each of these Courts against the background of the new economic governance now evolving within Europe accordingly promises to provide us with nuanced insights into the management of the crisis.
IV.1 Is the German Court a 'Dog that Barks and never Bites"?
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The attention which the complaints before the FCC against the ESM Treaty 2012. 39 What the highest judicial authority of Europe's most potent economy has to say about well-argued complaints matters. And yet, it was easy to 'hazard a pretty good guess at the ending'. Paul Craig's observation concerns the Pringle Case of the CJEU 40 but is equally valid with respect to the German case. It seemed simply inconceivable that the courts would interfere with high politics in matters of utmost importance. That, however, is not good enough a reason to close the academic files and shrug of the shoulders.
On closer inspection, the Judgment reveals a number of ambivalences. The most important one is the Court's defence of the budgetary power of the German Bundestag. This power is a democratic essential, protected by the eternity clause of the Basic Law. Its importance was already underlined in the previous Judgment on the rescue package for Greece 41 and its validity cannot be questioned in principle. Is it a principle with bite? In both judgments, the Court underlined that the Bundestag enjoyed wide latitude which the judiciary must respect. 42 Through this move, the rights of the Bundestag were re-defined in a proceduralising mode: the Parliament must be adequately informed, enabled to deliberate, and prevented from delegating its evaluation. This reading is in line with a principle of 'integration responsibility' 43 which the Court developed in its Lisbon judgment; a contested notion, but one which can, in our view, be understood as a search for a response to the tensions between integration and democracy. Such a benevolent reading is not evinced by the 12th September Judgment. To be sure, the form of judicial restraint, which the German court exercised when it gave the green light to the extensive indebtedness of the Federal Republic, is again embedded in procedural and institutional notions. The Court is not careful of 'foreign' concerns. The weight constitutionally placed upon the budgetary powers of the Bundestag, so we learn and understand, requires that the German Parliament retains the power to determine the most important conditions for future successful demands for capital disbursements. 44 In this passage, the Court once again strengthened the link between the Bundestag's budgetary responsibility and a distinctly German philosophy of stability (i.e., price stability and the independence of the ECB above all). As a consequence, the nature of the EMU as a stability community (Stabilitätsgemeinschaft) is even seen as being protected by the 'eternity clause' of Article 79 (3) of the German Basic Law as an unamendable core of Germany's constitutional identity. 45 After this move, the stability principles become the core of a refurbished European economic constitution. 46 All this, the Court hopes, will protect the democratic rights of German citizens. Non-German citizens of the Union, however, should not at all be amused. Why is budgetary autonomy not understood as a common European constitutional legacy, respect for which might surely be argued to be deducible from the respect paid to national laid down in Article 13 TFEU, or that the mandate allocated to the CJEU in the ESM Treaty exceeded judicial powers? Only a fool would dare to predict the dire consequences. The same kind of uncertainty governs with regard to the success of all of these measures. Under such circumstances, the CJEU could not and should not be expected to interfere, one might conclude. Nonetheless, in so doing, one must similarly concede that this conclusion implies a complete secession of law to discretionary political power. The onus must surely be one -for the lawyer at least -to commence the search for alternatives to this devastating legal default.
The search for such alternatives should allow for escape from the impasses to which Europe's crisis managements must respond, namely the design defects of EMU, its conceptually monetarist background, upon which the dedication of EMU to price stability rests and which has now become the cornerstone anticipated. But we are now concerned with a risk of a new kind. The converging attitudes of both courts in the assessment of the praxis of Europe's crisis management is disquieting because it accepts the primacy of discretionary politics in the management of the crisis and fails to develop any criteria against which the legitimacy of these practices might be assessed.
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At this point we return to our reference to the 'state of exception' made at the beginning of this essay. Schmittian notions are certainly always engraved in a specific context. 59 History does not repeat itself and situational contexts remain distinct. And yet, recourse to Schmitt is anything but far-fetched. 60 Crisis management practices which are neither foreseen in EU primary law, nor in national constitutions are justified with the argument that compliance with the letter of the law would cause more harm than its breach or daring interpretation. Even Carl Schmitt did not conceive of the state of exception as a permanent condition; his justification of a 'commissarial dictatorship' included an effort to overcome the problems that precipitated departure from the rule of law and to regain normal constitutionality. 61 In the present state of the Union, pertinent suggestions are urgent -and abound. However, they are mostly merely pragmatic and managerial, albeit that some constitutional lawyers and political philosophers have formulated some new propositions for a new constitutional architecture.
We have little room here to enter in these debates. We have presented our alternative of 'conflicts-law as Europe's constitutional form' elsewhere. 62 This is an approach which takes, 'unity in diversity", the fortunate motto of the illfated Draft Constitutional Treaty of 2003 seriously, and rejects the notion that federalist state building is a sustainable project. We argue instead for a radical 'proceduralisation' of the integration project in which the European judiciary engages in continuous juris-generative efforts (a 'Rechtfertigungsrecht'), which seek responses to Europe's complex conflict constellations. 63 Democratisation through conflicts-law constitutionalism cannot deliver ready-made responses to the financial crisis, but it can nevertheless claim to provide perspectives for a return to a constitutional European condition. To substantiate this perspective with respect to Pringle: monetary policy, fiscal policy and economic policy are assigned to different levels of governance in the Union.
They are, however, interdependent. In the terminology of the conflicts-law approach, this generates 'diagonal' conflicts. Their 'resolution' within Europe's crisis management is currently occurring through establishment of the primacy of 'the Political'. Conflicts-law constitutionalism, by contrast, would require legally structured ('constitutionalised') cooperative deliberation.
